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China’s Foreign Exchange Policy: Global Effects and United States 
Policy Options 
 
Brian Tribuna 
 
 
“China’s unfair currency policies have cost millions of Americans their jobs, and I 
believe inaction on this issue is dangerous to our economic recovery and continues to put at risk 
hundreds of thousands of additional American jobs.  When I travel around my district, I hear 
from small businesses and manufacturers on this issue. And they never ask for Congress to 
guarantee their success. All they want is a fair fight, for the rules to be the same. And I believe 
given a level playing field, American businesses will win every single time.”1  
 
China’s currency and exchange rate policy is the focus of much political rhetoric in the 
United States.  Many politicians and economists argue that China is keeping the remnimbi 
(RMB) artificially undervalued, which in turn gives them an unfair advantage in international 
trade at the expense of United States manufacturers and workers. As displayed by Congressman 
Donnelly in the above quote, many in the political arena blame China’s exchange rate policy for 
a multitude of problems facing the United States economy. Fresh off a presidential election, both 
candidates made it clear that they were going to “get tough” on China.  Republican nominee Mitt 
Romney went as far as declaring “I will label China as it is, a currency manipulator. And they 
will recognize that if they cheat, there is a price to pay.”2 President Obama has also been quoted 
as saying that “China’s trade surplus is directly related to its manipulation of its currency’s 
value.”3 Others are not so sure that the problem is as serious and clear-cut.  John Frisbie, the 
President of the U.S.-China Business Council, recognized that “[b]oth presidential candidates 
have said they will ‘get tough’ on China, but evidence has shown that the best way to make 
                                                          
1 157 CONG. REC. H6863-01 (Oct. 13, 2011) (statement of Donnelly) (West) 
2 Romney on China, 2012 REPUBLICAN CANDIDATES (Apr. 12, 2013, 2:03 PM), http://2012.republican-
candidates.org/Romney/China.php 
3 Robert W. Staiger & Alan O. Sykes, Currency “manipulation” and world trade: A caution, VOXEU (Jan. 30, 
2009), http://www.voxeu.org/article/currency-manipulation-and-world-trade-three-reasons-caution 
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progress is through comprehensive engagement – not political rhetoric.”4 James Dorn, a China 
specialist at the Cato Institute, warns that “[b]laming China for our woes is politically attractive 
but dangerous.”5 Instead of rash, politically charged, unilateral action by the United States 
against China to combat this perceived unfair economic imbalance, the United States should take 
a balanced, cautious, and collaborative effort to promote the economic and political interests of 
both countries. 
Part I of this paper will start with an overview of international monetary systems 
throughout history and then focus on China’s exchange rate policy, covering its evolution over 
the past several decades to its current state, its technical application in the context of the 
international monetary system, allegations that the Chinese government is artificially keeping the 
RMB undervalued. Next this section will take a comparative look at the macroeconomic 
strategies employed by the United States and China to gain a better understanding of why 
China’s exchange rate policy has become such a hot button political issue in the United States. 
Part II of this paper will examine unilateral policy options being considered by the United States 
to counter this perceived unfair trade practice by China.  Most of these options seem to be 
politically charged rather than based in sound political and diplomatic strategy, and this section 
will explore why such actions would most likely turn out to not only be ineffective, but 
dangerous and detrimental to United States economic relationships.  Part III will look at the 
potential for a balanced, collaborative, multilateral approach at the international level. These 
options include employing international economic organizations such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) or International Monetary Fund (IMF) and global economic forums such as 
the Group of Twenty (G-20).  The paper will conclude with a recommended course of action for 
                                                          
4 James A. Dorn, China and the Truth about the Senate’s Exchange Rate Oversight Act, CATO INSTITUTE (Oct. 4, 
2011) http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/china-truth-about-senates-exchange-rate-oversight-act 
5 Id. 
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the United States and the rest of the international economic community that focuses on 
collaboration and formation of symbiotic relationships instead of specific targeted attacks that 
could have serious negative consequences worldwide. International monetary policy, and the 
United States-China economic relationship in particular, is a highly complex and politically 
sensitive issue that needs to be approached in a manner that will promote global prosperity while 
simultaneously avoiding another catastrophic international financial crisis. 
 
International Monetary Policies 
  
The bulk of China’s most substantial monetary policy reform has occurred since the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.  A brief history of international 
monetary systems alongside China’s own reforms will be helpful in understanding the context of 
the current issues. 
History of International Monetary Systems  
 The last two centuries have witnessed dramatic changes to international monetary 
systems. Prior to World War I, global currencies generally followed a gold or silver standard
6
, 
where each nation’s currency was backed by and freely convertible into the precious metal 
pledged behind it.
7
 Following turbulent economic times, marked by two World Wars and the 
Great Depression, leaders from the Allied Nations met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to 
craft an international monetary system that would “combine the advantage of the classical gold 
standard (i.e. exchange rate stability) with the advantage of floating rates (i.e. independence to 
                                                          
6 Justin Yifu Lin et al., Reform of the International Monetary System: A Jagged History and Uncertain Prospects, 
(The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 6070, May 2012). While most nations during the period 
followed the gold standard, some, including China, followed the silver standard. 
7 Id. 
 4 
pursue national full employment policies).”8 The Bretton Woods regime fixed foreign currencies 
against the United States dollar, and the United States dollar was fixed at $35 per ounce of gold.
9
 
“Member countries could hold their official reserves mainly in the form of gold or dollar-
denominated assets and had the right to sell their dollars to the US Federal Reserve in exchange 
for gold at the official price.”10 Another important aspect of the Bretton Woods meetings was the 
establishment of the IMF
11
, whose responsibilities has greatly evolved since and are explored in 
greater depth in Part III on this paper. Even though exchange rates were fixed to the U.S. dollar, 
these rates were subject to change given they met a certain set of requirements as determined by 
the IMF.
12
 
 A series of issues with the Bretton Woods system, including United States 
macroeconomic policies and increased spending during the Vietnam War, led President Nixon to 
officially end convertibility of the U.S. Dollar to gold. 13 These actions set the groundwork for the 
prevailing international monetary system observed today, where most major currencies are in a 
free float against each other based on global market supply and demand, subject to certain 
limitations.14 
History of China’s Monetary System 
                                                          
8 MICHAEL D. BORDO & BARRY EICHENGREEN, The Bretton Woods International Monetary System: A Historical 
Overview, in A RETROSPECTIVE ON THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM: LESSONS FOR INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
REFORM, (University of Chicago Press, Jan. 1993) (available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6867.pdf). 
9 Lin, supra note 6. 
10 Lin, supra note 6. 
11 The main purpose of the World Bank was to “help integrate the less-developed economies into the world 
economy… through a combination of advice, direct loans, and guarantees of third party loans.” Philip O’Hara, 
Bretton Woods System and the Post Bretton Woods System, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (available 
at http://www.econ.tcu.edu/harvey/5133/bretton.html) 
12 Lin, supra note 6. 
13 Richard Nixon, President of United States, Address to the Nation Outlining a New Economic Policy: “The 
Challenge of Peace.”, (Aug. 15, 1974) (transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3115) Nixon 
also announced in his speech a ten percent tariff on all goods imported to the United States and a temporary freeze 
on wages and prices of goods to combat potential inflationary effects of the suspension.  
14 O’Hara, supra note 11. 
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When the PRC was founded in 1949, the “new central government unified the banking 
system by establishing a national bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), and a national 
currency” called the remnimbi (translated literally at the “people’s money”).15 The two major 
policies embraced by the PBOC in the early years of the PRC included “forbidding circulation of 
foreign currencies within China and… providing for state supervision over all inflows and 
outflows of foreign exchange.”16  This regime, which contributed to low levels of foreign direct 
investment, was largely held in place through the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping took his place 
as the paramount leader of China and started liberalizing trade and economic policies.
17
 
Throughout the 1980s and into the mid 1990s China employed a dual exchange rate 
system, which was composed of an “official fixed exchange rate system,” used by the 
government, and another system used as the official avenue for importers and exporters to gain 
access to RMB conversion through swap markets in which the rate was relatively market-
based.
18
 This created a lucrative black market for foreign exchange, sometimes referred to as a 
third exchange system, because there was a large discrepancy in the rate between the two 
markets.
 19
  In 1993 the official government rate for RMB-dollar conversion set at 5.77 yuan 
versus 7.70 yuan in the swap markets.
20
  
In 1994 the Chinese government merged the dual exchange system and pegged the RMB-
dollar conversion rate at 8.70 yuan.
21
 This new system is best categorized as a “market-based 
managed float system,” where the central bank initially maintained the stated 8.70 rate, but 
                                                          
15 Larry L. Drumm, Changing Money: Foreign Exchange Reform in the People's Republic of China, 18 Hastings 
Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 359, 362 (1995). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 WAYNE M. MORRISON & MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21625, CHINA’S CURRENCY POLICY: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC ISSUES (2011) 
19 Larry Drumm article 
20 MORRISON, supra note 18. 
21 Bryan Mercurio & Celine Sze Ning Leung, Is China a “Currency Manipulator”?: The Legitimacy of China’s 
Exchange Regime Under the Current International Legal Framework, 43 Int’l Law. 1257, 1261 (2009). 
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allowed intraday rates to float by 0.3% among banks trading the RMB.
22
 Eventually in 1997, the 
official stated rate was allowed to increase to 8.28 yuan.
23
 China was able to maintain this dollar 
peg by “buying (or selling) as many dollar denominated assets in exchange for newly printed 
yuan as needed to eliminate excess demand (supply) for the yuan.”24 This regime, which is the 
same method used to maintain the RMB’s current valuation, effectively counters market forces 
that determine exchange rates of other major currencies that are traded on a free-floating market. 
China justified this regime, as they similarly do today, by stating that it was intended to promote 
economic stability and encourage foreign investment during periods of rapid growth while the 
nation’s economy was still in developing stages.25 
In 2005, China further liberalized their monetary policy by instituting another 2.1% 
appreciation and pegging the yuan to a basket of currencies, rather than the dollar alone.
26
 The 
daily intraday trading range was also increased from 0.3% to 0.5% against this new basket of 
currencies. Since 2005, China has continued, albeit at what many consider too slow of a pace, to 
gradually implement policies that have lead to an appreciation of the RMB. There was a 
temporary suspension of RMB appreciation during the global financial crisis, where the RMB 
was again pegged at a fixed rate to the U.S. Dollar, partly in response to a decreased demand for 
Chinese exports.
27
  Since RMB appreciation resumed in June 2010, China has committed to 
                                                          
22 Id. 
23 MORRISON, supra note 18. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Mercurio, supra note 21, at 1261. While the precise composition of this currency basket has never been disclosed, 
China has stated that it is linked primarily to the dollar, euro, yen, and a few other major currencies.  Economic 
indicators however show that the exchange rate is still highly responsive to movement of the dollar, so it is very 
likely the basket is heavily weighted towards the dollar. 
27 See MORRISON, supra note 18, “China halted its currency appreciation policy around mid-July 2008, mainly 
because of declining global demand for Chinese products that resulted from the effects of the global financial crisis. 
In 2009, Chinese exports and imports fell by 15.9% and 11.3% over 2008 levels.  The Chinese government reported 
that thousands of export-oriented factories were shut down and that over 20 million migrant workers lost their jobs 
in 2009 because of the direct effects of the global economic slowdown. The RMB/dollar exchange was held 
relatively constant at 6.83 through around mid-June 2010.” 
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“proceed further with reform of the RMB exchange rate regime and to enhance RMB exchange 
rate flexibility.”28 As of April 8, 2013, the United States dollar to Chinese RMB exchange rate 
was trading at approximately 6.20 yuan, with a daily float allowance of 1.0%.
29
 
Comparative Look at Monetary Policy Management 
Exchange rate management is one cog in a much larger wheel of a nation’s broader 
economic goals.  Most of world’s major economies participate in certain actions to further these 
objectives, and a comparative look between the two largest
30
 (the United States and China) will 
demonstrate how China’s exchange rate management should be viewed at the international level. 
Quantitative Easing in the United States 
 The financial crisis in 2008 was one of the worst catastrophes to hit the international 
economy since the Great Depression.  In order to counter widespread distrust in the financial 
industry, inject liquidity into the markets, and restore order among global financial institutions, 
the Federal Reserve started engaging in what is defined as “quantitative easing.”31  Quantitative 
easing is a type of monetary policy where newly printed currency is used to purchase assets such 
as Treasury Securities in order to promote economic stability and keep interest rates low.
32
 In a 
statement from the Federal Reserve in January of 2013, the Federal Open Market Committee 
justified such practice by stating it was “firmly committed to fulfilling its statutory mandate from 
the Congress of promoting maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term 
                                                          
28 Id.  
29 XE: THE WORLD’S FAVORITE CURRENCY SITE, 
http://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=1&From=USD&To=CNY (last visited April 22, 2013). 
30 World’s largest economies as measured by 2012 Nominal GPD: United States at $15.7 trillion, China at $8.2 
trillion. World Economic Outlook: Hopes, Risks, Realities, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/pdf/text.pdf) (retrieved April 16, 2013). 
31 Andrew Bowman et al., Central Bank-Led Capitalism?, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 455, 468 (2013). 
32 Id. 
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interest rates.”33  This strategy was particularly important in 2008, when the Federal Reserve 
printed U.S. Dollars to purchase troubled assets from mortgage lenders Freddie Mae and Fannie 
Mae to help curb the effects of the housing bubble collapse.
34
 
 In practice, quantitative easing boils down to printing more money and lending it to 
banks at near zero-interest rates, in an effort to increase lending and stimulate the economy.
35
  
These efforts have not been without widespread criticism from the international community.  As 
the United States simultaneously criticized China for keeping the RMB below market rates, it 
was flooding the capital markets with an increased supply of dollars. Xia Bin, an adviser to the 
central bank of China, stated that as “long as the world exercises no restraint in issuing global 
currencies such as the dollar – and this is not easy – then the occurrence of another crisis in 
inevitable.”36 Notable economists and finance ministers from Thailand, Hong Kong, and the 
Eurozone have also expressed concern and caution over the use of continued quantitative easing 
in the United States.
37
  
 Throwing non-protectionist political rhetoric at a monetary policy such as quantitative 
easing, a popular strategy among its proponents in the United States, does not lessen the artificial 
effects it has on the global economy.  Stripping away United States political rhetoric and 
                                                          
33 Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
SYSTEM, (as effective Jan. 29, 2013) available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC_LongerRunGoals.pdf. 
34 See generally Mark Sunshine, Experts Agree The Fed’s in Big Trouble, FORBES, (Apr. 23, 2013). 
35 Larry Elliot, Quantitative Easing, GUARDIAN (Jan 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/oct/14/businessglossary. 
36 Bettina Wassener, Emerging-Market Countries Criticize Fed Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/05/business/global/05global.html?_r=0. 
37 Id. “In Thailand, Finance Minister Korn Chatikavanij said the central bank governor had ‘confirmed discussions 
with central banks of neighboring countries, which are ready to impose measures together, if needed, to curb 
possible speculative money flowing into the region,’ according to Reuters. Norman Chan, chief executive of the 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority, warned that the Fed’s new measures — informally known as QE2, denoting the 
second round of what is called quantitative easing — added to the risk of asset bubbles, including a bubble in the 
city’s housing sector. ‘For emerging markets, QE2 means a guarantee of the ‘low for longer’ scenario through the 
first half of 2011, which suggests inflows into emerging markets will continue, if not strengthen,’ Richard Yetsenga 
and Pablo Goldberg, analysts at HSBC, said in a note on Thursday. ‘The tide generated by the liquidity from abroad 
is bigger than whatever wall emerging market countries can put up.’“ 
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justifications from Ben Bernanke does not detract from the fact that the Federal Reserve is 
actively distorting the international economic environment. By guaranteeing the purchase of 
Treasury Securities and injecting more capital into the markets, everything from the true value of 
the dollar, commodity prices, and global interest rates are going to deviate from what they would 
be under a true market-based system free from governmental intervention.
38
 So how does this 
differ from China’s perceived “currency manipulation?”  Interestingly, a report came out in April 
2013 that a woman in the Kunming Province in China filed a lawsuit against the United States 
for devaluing her United States Dollar holdings, $250, through the use of quantitative easing.
39
 
Though she is only seeking $1 in damages, and a “promise from the U.S. central bank to stop 
abusing its ‘monopoly’ over currency creation,”40 it is interesting to see that the rest of the world 
has taken notice and noted frustration over the potentially hypocritical monetary policies being 
embraced in the United States.   The next section explores the policies and actions taken by the 
Chinese government used to keep its exchange rate within its stated target. 
Exchange Rate Management in China  
There are two primary methods that China uses to keep the exchange rate within the 
stated target and 1.0% trading band.  The first is active participation in foreign exchange 
markets: “[A]t the first sign of an appreciating RMB, the Chinese government respond[s] by 
increasing the supply of RMB and decreasing the supply of another nation’s currency by 
purchasing that nation’s currency on the currency market, thus restoring the desired 
equilibrium.”41 This method in particular has led to China’s massive accumulation of dollar 
                                                          
38 Id. 
39 Michael Kitchen, Chinese women reportedly wants to sue Federal Reserve over QE, MARKETWATCH, (April 15, 
2013) http://blogs.marketwatch.com/thetell/2013/04/15/china-woman-reportedly-wants-to-sue-federal-reserve-over-
qe/. 
40 Id. 
41 Paul V. Sharobeem, Biting the Hand That Feeds Us: A Critical Analysis of U.S. Policy Trends Concerning 
Chinese Currency Manipulation, 19 FLA. J. INT'L L. 697, 698 (2007) 
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denominated securities, specifically United States Treasury bonds.  Instead of holding actual 
dollars in their foreign reserve, which are likely only to decrease in value over time due to 
inflation and the time value of money, the Chinese government invests these accumulated dollars 
in (nearly) risk-free United States Treasury securities.
42
  As of December 2012, China held more 
than $3.3 trillion in foreign currency reserves,
43
 and more than $1.2 trillion in U.S. Treasury 
Securities.
44
  
The second method China employs when trying to maintain the target exchange rate is 
strict capital controls. For example “the Chinese government required firms in China to exchange 
most of their hard currency earnings to the central government in exchange for RMB. While the 
Chinese government did eventually [post-merger of the dual exchange system] allow the RMB to 
be free convertible ‘for purposes of trade in goods and services,’ capital transactions remained 
subject to strict controls to curtail unpredictable flows of capital into or out of the country. This 
meant while the RMB was convertible for trade transactions, it was still not freely convertible for 
other types of financial flows such as portfolio investments.”45 As explained in Part III, however, 
in recent years China has been implementing reforms to loosen these capital restrictions and 
encourage foreign investment in mainland China. 
The Chinese government defends these actions by claiming a carefully managed RMB is 
important to maintain economic stability, not to gain an unfair advantage in trade.
46
 They further 
claim that abandoning their current currency policy could lead to wide-scale layoffs, particularly 
                                                          
42 Paul V. Sharobeem, Biting the Hand that Feeds Us: A Critical Analysis of U.S. Policy Trends Concerning 
Chinese Currency Manipulation, 19 Fla. J. Int’l L. 697 (2007) at 700. 
43 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Int’l Affairs, Report to Cong. On Int’l Econ. and Exch. Rate Policies (April 
12, 2013) available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-rate-
policies/Documents/Foreign%20Exchange%20Report%20April%202013.pdf. 
44 Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/mfh(shl2012).txt. 
45 Sharobeem, supra note 42, at 698-99. 
46 WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33536, China-U.S. Trade Issues (2012).  
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in the fragile manufacturing sector, and thereby lead to political unrest and threaten national 
stability.
47
 Another concern is the underdeveloped banking system in China that could be very 
vulnerable to a rapid and drastic shift in the exchange rate policy.
48
 The banking sector’s intimate 
relationship with state owned enterprises, coupled with a shock of speculative pressures likely to 
stem from an immediately floating exchange rate could plunge the banking sector in China into a 
financial crisis.
49
 
 Determining the Value of the RMB 
 There are a number of economic measures and indicators that can assist in determining 
whether, and to what extent, a country’s currency is overvalued or undervalued.  Two major 
measures looked at by economists when determining the level of intervention and misalignment 
are the current account surplus and foreign reserve accumulation.
50
 A current account surplus is a 
situation where there exists an “imbalance in a nation’s balance of payments current account in 
which payments received by the country for selling domestic exports are greater than payments 
made by the country for purchasing imports.”51 When the surplus is significant, it implies that 
export growth is substantially more significant than import growth, which is an economic effect 
of having an undervalued currency.  In 2007, China’s current account surplus reached a peak of 
10.1% of its GDP.
52
 However, as a result of lower international demand for Chinese exports 
during the financial crisis and a broader economic downturn, China’s current account surplus fell 
to 2.3% of GPD in 2012.
53
  This drastic decrease, though still substantial relative to other 
countries, shows there seems to be a gradual rebalancing of the Chinese economy and is contrary 
                                                          
47 Id. 
48 Sharobeem, supra note 42, at 707-708. 
49 Id. 
50 Report to Cong. On Int’l Econ. and Exch. Rate Policies, supra note 43. 
51 Definition of current account surplus, ECONOMIC GLOSSARY, http://glossary.econguru.com/economic-
term/current+account+surplus (last visited Apr. 28, 2013). 
52 Report to Cong. On Int’l Econ. and Exch. Rate Policies, supra note 43. 
53 Id. 
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to many claims that China is manipulating its currency specifically in an effort to gain an unfair 
advantage in trade. 
 Another measure that indicates active participation in exchange rate misalignment is a 
country’s accumulation of foreign reserves.  Foreign reserve accumulation is the direct result of a 
central bank’s active participation in foreign exchange markets, a practice the PBOC utilizes 
when maintaining the exchange rate within its prescribed 1.0% daily trading band and target 
exchange rate.
54
 While China’s accumulation of foreign reserves slowed to $21.3 billion per 
quarter in the first three quarters of 2012, the first quarter of 2013 showed a record purchase of 
$109.9 billion in foreign exchange by the PBOC and other financial institutions in China.
55
 
These numbers, however, are based on estimates because China does not specifically disclose its 
data on foreign exchange market activity.
56
 Also, although China is an active member of the 
IMF, they do not subscribe to the Special Data Dissemination Standard
57
 on reserve transparency 
nor do they report to the IMF’s Composition of Official Exchange Reserves Database.58 Failure 
to report this crucial and specific data leads to further valuation difficulties when attempting to 
determine what an actual market-based exchange rate would be for China. 
 So comes the million-dollar (or, RMB 6,165,000.06
59
) question: to what extent is the 
RMB undervalued? Economists across the world have come up with estimates over the past 
decade that vary wildly. In the IMF’s July 2012 Pilot External Sector Report it stated that the 
RMB was “moderately” undervalued, between 5.0% to 10.0%, against a broad basket of 
                                                          
54 See Part I, section on mechanics of China’s mechanics of exchange rate management. 
55 Report to Cong. On Int’l Econ. and Exch. Rate Policies, supra note 43. 
56 Id. 
57 Factsheet - IMF Standards for Data Dissemination, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/data.htm., (last visited Apr. 29, 2013). 
58 Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/cofer/eng/, (last visited Apr. 29, 2013). “Data dissemination standards are 
important because they help enhance the availability of timely and comprehensive statistics, which contributes to the 
pursuit of sound macroeconomic policies and efficient functioning of financial markets.” 
59 Based on a $1/RMB 6.17 exchange rate as cited by google.com on May 1, 2013. 
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currencies.
60
 In 2012, Fred Bergstein recommended during testimony before the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee of Ways and Means that over the next three years China should let 
its exchange rate appreciate by 20.0% to 25.0%.
61
 Other estimates over the past decade include a 
12.0% to 50.0% range,
62
 40%,
63
 and a more modest 15.0 to 20.0% range.
64
 These estimates 
prove one thing for certain: while it is generally agreed in the international economic community 
that RMB exchange rate is held below what a natural market level would be, there is no 
consensus on the actual valuation.  Nevertheless, politicians in the United States are still calling 
for unilateral action against China to combat these perceived unfair policies. 
 
Potential Unilateral Policy Options for the United States 
 
 One of the most commonly advocated courses of action for the United States to respond 
to China’s perceived currency manipulation is to treat it as an unfair trade practice under United 
States trade law.  This section will give an overview of existing trade law, including the Tariff 
Act of 1930
65
 and its countervailing duty and antidumping provisions, and the role of the 
Commerce department in resolving trade disputes.  Next this section will explore United States 
legislative options that look to amend existing trade law, specifically the Currency Reform for 
Fair Trade Act and the Currency Exchange Oversight Reform Act, and the inherent problems 
                                                          
60 Pilot External Sector Report: July 2, 2012, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/070212.pdf. 
61 C. Fred Bergstein, Director, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Testimony before the Hearing on 
China’s Exchange Rate Policy, Committee on Ways and Means, US House of Representatives (September 15, 
2010). 
62 Dorn, supra note 4. 
63 Paul Eckert, Senate Approves China Yuan Bill, House Fate Unclear, REUTERS, (Oct. 11, 2011) available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/11/us-usa-china-idUSTRE79A5AO20111011 
64 David E. Sanger & Michael Wines, More Countries Adopt China’s Tactics on Currency, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 3. 
2010) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/04/world/04currency.html 
65 19 U.S.C. § 1202, et. seq.(West) 
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with both of these acts.  Aside from these two main bills, a handful of other legislative options 
have been explored in Congress, and a brief explanation (alongside why they ultimately failed) 
will help illustrate the mindset of politicians in the United States as they advocate these bills.  
This section will then explore the power of the Treasury Department, and the affirmative duties it 
has under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
66
 in identifying countries it 
deems to be currency manipulators.  
United States Legislative Approaches by Amending Existing Trade Law 
 Overview of Existing United States Trade Law 
 Since its adoption, the Tariff Act of 1930 has provided the legal basis for the United 
States to counter unfair practices in international trade.
67
  The countervailing duty and 
antidumping provisions in the Tariff Act of 1930 are two major avenues used in the United 
States to combat unfair international trade practices.  Countervailing duties are imposed when is 
it determined “that the government of a country or any public entity within the territory of a 
country is providing, directly or indirectly, a countervailable subsidy with respect to the 
manufacture, production, or export of a class or kind of merchandise imported, or sold (or likely 
to be sold) for importation, into the United States.”68 Countervailing duties deal directly with 
foreign government action in subsidizing their domestic industries. The purpose, therefore, of the 
United States in trying to counter these duties is to create equilibrium in international trade by 
offsetting the unfair advantage gained by a foreign exporter to the United States through 
governmental subsidization.
69
   
                                                          
66 Pub. L. 100-418, Aug. 23, 1988, 102 Stat. 1107 (West) 
67 Sharobeem, supra note 42, at 713. 
68 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671(a)(1) (2012) (West) 
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Antidumping laws, on the other hand, focus on private actors and determine “whether 
subject merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold at less than fair value” in the United States 
marketplace.
70
 Domestic competitors are thereby injured “when a company exports to the United 
States at prices that are less than the normal value of its products.”71 Antidumping laws seek to 
protect these domestic producers of goods who manufacture products similar to those that are 
being sold by foreign exporters at injuriously low prices. “The central aim of the antidumping 
laws is to protect domestic industries from foreign manufactured goods that are sold injuriously 
in the United States at prices below the fair market value of those goods in their home market.”72 
Though countervailing duty and antidumping laws deal with problems that have different 
origins (i.e. government for countervailing duties and exporters for antidumping), investigations 
and enforcement action are largely parallel. The first step for an “interested party”73 to initiate 
either an antidumping or countervailing duty investigation is to file a petition with an 
“administering authority.”74 The United States Department of Commerce (DOC) and the United 
States International Trade Commission (ITC) then share responsibilities in both of these 
proceedings, which include investigating whether an injury has occurred and the extent of that 
injury with respect to domestic producers. 
75
   
There is one case, Nucor Fastener Div. v. United States,
76
 where a United States producer 
of steel fasteners filed suit under current law challenging Commerce’s decision not to conduct a 
countervailing duty investigation of alleged Chinese subsidization through currency 
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manipulation.  Though Commerce conducted a countervailing duty investigation against China, 
and in fact included twenty-six specific instances where Nucor alleged countervailable subsidies, 
it declined to investigate the alleged currency manipulation as a subsidy issue.
77
 Commerce 
stated in its investigation: 
“[Nucor] alleges that the [government]-maintained exchange rate effectively prevents the 
appreciation of the Chinese currency ([“RMB”]) against the U.S. dollar. Therefore, when 
producers/exporters in the PRC sell their dollars at official foreign exchange banks, as required 
by law, the producers receive more RMB than they otherwise would if the value of the RMB 
were set by market mechanisms.... [Nucor] has failed to sufficiently allege that the receipt of the 
excess RMB is contingent on export or export performance because receipt of the excess RMB is 
independent of the type of transaction or commercial activity for which dollars are converted or 
of the particular company or individuals converting the dollars. Therefore, we do not plan on 
investigating this program because [Nucor] has failed to properly allege the specificity 
element.”78 
 
It is important to note that Commerce declined to investigate due to a jurisdictional issue, and did 
not consider currency manipulation as an illegal subsidy on the merits. Nucor’s complaint was 
dismissed because their challenge against Commerce was unripe.
79
 This case, however, sheds 
light on the legislation being considered by Congress, and raises the question of whether United 
States trade law is a reasonable and forum for consideration of alleged currency manipulation.  
 Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act 
 The Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act of 2013 was introduced and assigned to a 
congressional committee on March 20, 2013.
80
 Its stated purpose is to “amend title VII of the 
Tariff Act of 1930 to clarify that countervailing duties may be imposed to address subsidies 
relating to a fundamentally undervalued currency of any foreign country.”81 Over the last number 
of congressional sessions, versions of this bill have been introduced in both the House and 
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Senate, and have garnered widespread bipartisan support.
82
 Though different versions of this bill 
have passed both the House and Senate, no version has been enacted to date. 
 All versions of this bill would “clarify” that a “fundamentally misaligned currency” could 
be considered an actionable subsidy by the DOC under existing countervailing duty laws.
83
 This 
language implies that an undervalued currency acts as either a direct or indirect subsidy on 
foreign exporters, and the United States should be able to impose additional duties on these 
exports in order to prevent harm to domestic producers.  First, the DOC would be required to 
determine whether a country’s currency is fundamentally undervalued by looking at a number of 
factors over a trailing 18-month period including active intervention in currency markets, at least 
a 5 percent undervalued real effective exchange rate, significant and persistent global current 
accounts surpluses, and the quantity of foreign asset reserves held by the foreign government.
84
 
The bill directs the DOC to determine the extent of a country’s currency undervaluation by using 
a number of different techniques depending on available data, including the valuation 
methodologies employed by the IMF Consultative Group on Exchange Rate Issues, “generally 
accepted economic and econometric techniques,” data from other international organizations or 
governments, or “inflation-adjusted, trade-weighted exchange rates.”85 A similar bill has also 
been bouncing around United States politics in recent years, which goes beyond the scope of the 
Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act. 
 Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act 
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 The Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act
86
, which passed the Senate in 2011 
but eventually died in the house, shares some similarities with the Currency Reform for Fair 
Trade Act. In addition to amending countervailing duty law to include currency manipulation as 
an actionable subsidy, as with the Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act, this bill imposes addition 
duties on the Treasury and DOC:  
“The bill would require the Treasury Department to issue a semiannual report to Congress on 
international monetary policy and currency exchange rates, determine which major global 
currencies are in fundamental misalignment, and designate certain misaligned currencies for 
priority action. Treasury would be required to seek negotiations with countries designated for 
priority action. If efforts were not made to correct the currency misalignment, the following 
actions would be taken in regard to that country: (1) The Commerce Department would be 
required to factor in the estimated level of currency undervaluation when determining 
antidumping duties; (2) the President would be required to prohibit the procurement by the 
federal government of products and services from the country unless it is a party to the WTO’s 
GPA; (3) the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) would not be able to approve any 
new financing with respect to a project located within the country; (4) the U.S. Executive 
Director at each multilateral bank would be told to oppose the approval of any new financing to 
the government of a country, or for a project located within a country, that issues a currency 
designated for priority action. If a country that has a currency designated for priority action failed 
to take steps to eliminate the fundamental misalignment within 360 days after its designation by 
the Treasury Department, the following would occur: (1) the USTR would be required to initiate 
a dispute resolution case against the priority country; (2) the Treasury Department would be 
required to consult with the Federal Reserve System to consider undertaking remedial 
intervention in international currency markets.”87 
 
This bill, clearly, is more far-reaching than the Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act, and if ever 
signed into law would be a serious shot across the bow of the Chinese government by compelling 
interagency actions by the United States government against China.  This bill also mandates that 
currency undervaluation would need to be considered when calculating antidumping margins, 
further amending trade law into unchartered and potentially dangerous waters. There are similar 
arguments both in support and in criticism for this bill and the Currency Reform for Fair Trade 
Act. 
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Advocates for these options contend that an undervalued RMB is having a hugely 
detrimental effect on the United States GDP and is a major contributing factor to job losses in the 
United States, specifically in the manufacturing sector.  In a report from the House Ways and 
Means committee, the committee cites an estimate from Paul Krugman, a Nobel Prize winning 
economist, that the United States GDP is reduced by 1.4% annually as a direct result of an 
undervalued RMB.
88
 Fred Bergstein, an economist at the Peterson Institute, is also referred to in 
the report in claiming that allowing the RMB to appreciate to a true market rate would create 
approximately 500,000 manufacturing jobs in the United States.
89
 In testimony before the 
Committee on Ways and Means in 2010, Mr. Bergstein specifically claimed that “[u]nder current 
conditions of high unemployment, an improvement of $50 billion to $120 billion in the U.S. 
trade balance would generate 300,000 to 700,000 new U.S. jobs.”90  
 There is also substantial opposition to these legislative options. In a letter to Congress, 
members of the business community expressed concern over such unilateral retaliatory measures.  
Authored by organizations including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Foreign 
Trade Council, and the U.S.-China Business Council, among others, the letter highlights many 
negative consequences such action could trigger.
91
  The broad message embodied by this letter is 
that the very complex U.S.-China economic relationship cannot be resolved through targeting a 
specific issue such as exchange rate management, and taking unilateral retaliatory action as 
suggested in this bill would compromise other aspects of the relationship including intellectual 
property rights, market access issues, and liberalization of the Chinese financial services 
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industry.
92
  They also express hesitation that the legislation would have its intended effect of 
forcing China to rapidly reform their exchange rate policy, but instead could spark a currency or 
trade war that would have near universal negative consequences across the world.
93
 
Other Unilateral Options for the United States 
 Countervailing Currency Intervention 
 Another option being considered by some commentators, and which is also part of the 
Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2011, is countervailing currency intervention. 
Mr. Bergsten, mentioned above, suggests that when China (or other alleged currency 
manipulators, such as Japan) intervenes in the foreign exchange markets, the Treasury should 
sell an equivalent amount of U.S. dollars or dollar-denominated assets to counter the effects on 
the exchange rate.
94
 There are, of course, technical problems involved when trying to actively 
intervene because the RMB is inconvertible for capital transactions.  Mr. Bergsten suggests using 
proxies such as debt instruments and futures contracts through third-party intermediaries that 
would have the same constructive effect of a direct countervailing currency intervention.
95
  
Treasury Department 
 Twice a year, pursuant to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, the 
Treasury Department is required to determine if any country is manipulating their currency to 
either gain an unfair advantage in trade or to prevent effective balance of payments 
adjustments.
96
 If a country is deemed to be manipulating their currency for one of these reasons, 
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the Treasury Department is thus compelled to initiate negotiations with the country, and if 
necessary, bring a complaint to an international economic organization.
97
  
 The last time the Treasury Department labeled a country as a currency manipulator was 
July 1994, prior to China’s major reforms as discussed in Part I, where it stated that “[b]ased on 
China’s continued reliance on foreign exchange restrictions, it is Treasury’s judgment that China 
manipulates its exchange system to prevent balance of payments adjustment and gain unfair 
advantage in trade.”98 Since 1994, however, the Treasury Department has not named any country 
as a currency manipulator for reasons of gaining an unfair advantage in trade or to prevent 
effective balance of payment adjustments.
99
 
Recommendations for the Unilateral United States Options  
 My first recommendation regarding unilateral United States option would be for 
Congress to abandon the idea of amending our existing trade law to include currency 
intervention as an actionable subsidy under either countervailing duty or antidumping law. 
Proponents of such legislation assure the bills are WTO-consistent, because the United States 
and other members of the WTO are within their rights to take remedial measures to counter 
unfair trade practices in the form of countervailable subsidies (which would include currency 
manipulation under the new bill). However, there is no precedent in the WTO of classifying a 
country’s exchange rate policy as a form of countervailable subsidy. If the United States imposed 
additional duties on China based on an undervalued RMB, China has the power to bring action 
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through the WTO.
100
 In order for the United States to be successful in such an action, it would 
not matter that amended United States trade law would classify currency manipulation as an 
actionable subsidy. Currency manipulation would still need to be classified as a subsidy under 
the WTO treaty, something the WTO has not made any indication that it has intentions to do.
101
  
Another glaring problem would be placing specific valuation on the extent of RMB 
misalignment.  As explained in Part I, estimates range anywhere from 5.0% to 50.0%, and the 
bills as introduced would give the DOC great flexibility in determining what the exchange rate 
should be.  This would in effect be telling China that “we [the United States] alone know the true 
value of the dollar-yuan exchange rate and have the authority to unilaterally penalize Chinese 
companies for pricing their products using the official exchange rate.”102As explained above, 
there has never been a successful action brought through the DOC naming deliberate currency 
devaluation as either a direct or indirect subsidy by a foreign government.
103
  This course of 
action, if followed through to actual imposition of duties, would apply additional duties on all 
exports from China, whereas countervailing duty law has historically been used to target industry 
or sector specific action.  This has the potential to spark retaliatory measures by the China. 
Furthermore, there is danger that these actions are not WTO compliant, which raises additional 
concerns that members of Congress should consider.  
 Adjusting antidumping margins to account for exchange rate misalignment would also 
run into problems.  Conceptually, antidumping penalizes individual companies who price their 
products at levels below fair-market value and sell in foreign markets, thereby hurting domestic 
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producers in those foreign markets.
104
 Anticompetitive currency undervaluation, on the other 
hand, deals with macroeconomic policies that individual companies have no control over.
105
 “If 
exchange rate undervaluation were to be taken into account in [antidumping] calculations, a 
product that is not dumped will suddenly have a dumping margin.”106 This is parallel to the 
problems faced with imposing countervailing duties across the board on all Chinese companies, 
when the real focus should be on the macroeconomic policies being embraced at the highest 
levels of the Chinese government.  While amending trade law does not seem like a viable option, 
there may be actions the Treasury could take through the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act if it were amended to reflect more accurately upon the current economic climate.  
 Instead of reverting back to pre-2005 reform treatment of China’s exchange policies 
under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which requires a strict “yes or no” 
determination of whether a country is manipulating its currency for illegitimate reasons, I 
suggest potential amendments or clarifications to the Act which might create tiers or levels of 
currency intervention that could compel different actions by the Treasury. Instead of coming out 
and labeling China (or other countries) as a currency manipulator, having different categories 
that reflect the potential harm being done in the international community as a result of differing 
degrees of intervention could have differing degrees of compulsory action against the 
counterparty. Of course, this suggestion still falls under the umbrella of unilateral action by the 
United States and runs the risk of retaliatory or reactionary measures by those given a specific 
label, but it may inject more usefulness into the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988 which has not compelled any serious remedial action in nearly 20 years. 
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A Balanced Multilateral Approach 
  
 Given the rapidly expanding rate of globalization, China’s recent ascension to a global 
economic superpower, and the current state of the global economy,
107
 it makes more logical 
sense to approach exchange rate misalignment on a multilateral basis. First this section will 
explore adversarial options that include appealing to organizations such as the WTO and IMF.  
Next it will discuss international economic forums, specifically the Group of Twenty, and I will 
make recommendations based on recent pledges by the Chinese government made to the 
international community. 
International Economic Organizations 
 As made clear by the preceding sections, any unilateral action by the United States, 
though potentially helpful to members of Congress looking to get reelected, is likely to be 
ineffective, potentially hypocritical, and perhaps will violate commitments made by the United 
States to the WTO. Yet year after year these bills get introduced and bounced around through 
Congress, likely with the intention to show China that if they do not continue with substantial 
currency reform, we have weapons in our arsenal that are ready to counter these perceived unfair 
trade practices. 
A more sensible, and likely more effective approach is a collaborative, multilateral 
engagement between the United States, China, and other leading global economies.  This section 
will first explore the existing international organizations of the WTO and IMF and how they may 
handle allegations of currency manipulation. Next this section will take a look at the Group of 
Twenty, and examine the potential for multilateral engagement through this cooperative 
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international forum.  Finally, I will make recommendations that combine some of the beneficial 
aspects of each, which would help promote cooperation and mutually beneficial action. 
 Appealing to the World Trade Organization or the International Monetary Fund 
 Appealing to international economic organizations such as the WTO or IMF, at first 
glance, seems like a logical and potentially effective means of settling exchange rate 
management disputes.  However, there exists somewhat of a paradox between these two 
organizations where exchange rate misalignment seems to fall through the cracks: while the 
WTO is charged with governing rules concerning international trade, and possesses relatively 
effective enforcement mechanisms
108
, the IMF has jurisdiction over exchange rate issues but 
lacks any effective means of enforcement.
109
 
The WTO is the premier international organization for promoting fair trade practices 
among all of its members.
110
 Its primary focus is on traditional unfair trade practices such as 
government subsidies to domestic industries.
111
 However, similar to the problems faced under 
United States trade law as evidenced by the legislation described above, it is unclear that 
intentional currency undervaluation would be considered an actionable subsidy under the 
existing WTO framework.  China has repeatedly stated that its exchange rate policy is not 
designed to give it an unfair advantage in international trade, a threshold requirement under both 
United States and international law, but to promote economic stability.
112
 Therefore, this 
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exchange policy “cannot be said to frustrate the intent of GATT in contravention of Article XV 
given its role is raising living standards and employment.”113  
China also generally seems to be in compliance with IMF obligations regarding exchange 
rate management.  The IMF was established during the Bretton Woods meetings, and now has 
near universal membership with the exception of North Korea, the Vatican, and a handful of 
small European countries.
114
 Its main purposes are to maintain equilibrium in members’ balance 
of payments and to stabilize currency exchange rates.
115
 A careful and in-depth analysis done by 
Bryan Mercurio and Celine Sze Ning Leung in “Is China a ‘Currency Manipulator’?: The 
Legitimacy of China’s Exchange Regime Under the Current International Legal Framework” 
concludes that China is in compliance with the IMF articles agreement, specifically its technical 
determination of its exchange rate, mechanics used to maintain the rate within a targeted range, 
and capital controls used to monitor financial flows into and out of the country.
116
 Even if it 
could be proven that China was in violation of the IMF articles of agreement, the IMF lacks any 
serious mode of enforcement and would likely be hesitant to employ such drastic measures 
unless a very serious situation called for it. 
Bringing an action against China with either the WTO or IMF with respect to currency 
manipulation is unlikely to be successful to any serious degree. The only likely outcome is that 
such action would most likely just lead to strained U.S.-China relations by what some consider 
simply boils down to a “name-and-shame” tactic against China.117 
 The Group of Twenty and International Economic Forums 
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 The “Group of Twenty, or G-20, is a forum for advancing international economic 
cooperation and coordination among 20 major advanced and emerging-market 
economies.”118The G-20’s predecessor, the G-7, was made up of Canada, France, Italy, Japan, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States, and was formed after World War II in an effort to 
coordinate international economic efforts.
119
 While the G-7 still convenes periodically, the G-20 
has become the premier forum for advancing international economic cooperation and has added 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South 
Korea, and the European Union.
120
 The G-20 was officially formed in 1999 with its first meeting 
in Canada the following year.
121
 but held its first summit in 2008 in Washington, D.C., in a 
response to the global financial crisis.
122
 The G-20 members now represent two-thirds of the 
world’s population, 90% of global GPD, 80% of world trade, and produce 84% of the world’s 
fossil fuel emissions.
123
 On its website, the G-20 claims its major accomplishments include 
“strengthening the role of emerging economies, such as BRICS, reforming international financial 
institutions, improving discipline and tightening oversight over national financial institutions and 
regulators, improving the quality of financial regulations in economies whose regulatory 
problems led to the crisis, and creating financial and organizational safety nets to prevent severe 
economic slumps in the future.”124 
 In theory, an economic forum of this size and breadth should be an effective means to 
attaining international economic stability and cooperation.  One instance where the G-20 has 
proven to be remarkably effective was during the financial crisis of 2008. When member 
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countries were faced with very serious and dire financial problems, each had an incentive to sit 
down at the bargaining table and work out mutually beneficial solutions to problems being faced 
worldwide.
125
 Critics however claim, that similar to the IMF, any agreements or pronouncements 
made during these G-20 meetings and summits lack any meaningful enforcement mechanism 
beyond “naming and shaming.”126  
Recommendation 
 A nation’s exchange rate policy is one facet of a highly complex global economic 
landscape, and a system of threats, sanctions, and name-calling is not a sustainable or effective 
strategy to promote general international prosperity. Recent economic indicators continue to 
show that the RMB has been consistently appreciating against the dollar, and other econometrics 
imply that imbalances between China and the United States are gradually moving toward 
equilibrium.  Since major currency reforms began in 2005, the RMB has appreciated 33.8% 
based on the real effective exchange rate, which accounts for other monetary pressures such as 
inflation and a country’s purchasing power.127 China’s economy has been growing at dizzying 
rates over the past decade, but recently it has started to cool off.  In 2011 its real GPD growth 
slowed to 9.1%, and further in 2012 to 7.8%.
128
 Consensus forecasts see China’s GPD growth 
stabilizing around 8.0% over the next two years.
129
 Despite this strong growth, the global 
economic environment weakened in the latter half of 2012, partly due to decreased export output 
from Japan and the Euro Zone.
130
  
 In March 2013 at the National People’s Congress, China’s new leadership pledged to 
“steadily carry out reforms to make interest rates and the RMB exchange rate more market-
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based.”131 These pledges were a reiteration of the February 2013 G-20 Finance Ministers and 
Central Bank Governors Meeting in Moscow, where China pledged not to “target exchange rates 
for competitive purposes, and reaffirmed their commitment to move more rapidly toward more 
market-determined exchange rate systems and exchange rate flexibility to reflect underlying 
fundamentals.”132 They also pledged only to actively intervene in foreign exchange markets 
when necessary to quell excessive volatility.
133
 
 These promises made by Chinese leadership seem to be in line with what the rest of the 
global economic community, specifically the United States, has been looking for from China for 
years. A number of steps should be taken by China in the coming years to help its exchange rate 
reach a market-determined rate as they have committed to at the G-20. 
 A first step China could take is to continue to further liberalize its capital controls.  
Recently, the global community has seen limited progress in this area: 
“In line with its commitments in the SE&D, China more than doubled the total dollar amount 
that foreigners can invest in China’s stock and bond markets under its Qualified Investor 
Institutional Investor program from $30 billion to $80 billion. China has also permitted some 
offshore banks and financial institutions to invest RMB holdings into the domestic interbank 
bond market; allowed for the development of cross-border exchange traded funds between Hong 
Kong and mainland China; made it easier for domestic Chinese firms to raise funds in the 
offshore market by issuing offshore RMB-denominated bonds; [among other things].”134 
 
China should continue with these financial reforms, and the United States should encourage this 
reform with investment and support form its long-established financial institutions.   
 Another step China should take is to increase its foreign exchange transparency by 
subscribing to the IMF’s Special Data Dissemination Standard135 on reserve transparency and 
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report to the IMF’s Composition of Official Exchange Reserves Database.136 This cooperation 
with international standards would give legitimacy to the promises being made by China’s new 
leadership and prove to the global economic community that their exchange rate policies are not 
being carried out for illegitimate reasons.  
 If China continues with gradual appreciation of the RMB, loosens capital controls, and 
follows through with promises made during G-20 meetings and other international economic 
summits, no action by the United States or any other organization is necessary.  As explained in 
Part I, an immediate and drastic appreciation of the RMB could have a doomsday effect on the 
Chinese economy, specifically the underdeveloped banking system and manufacturing sector.  
The United States should adopt a wait-and-see approach, and give the new Chinese 
administration the opportunity to carry out its promises.  But what if China does not? What if 
capital controls tighten, rapid foreign reserve accumulation and market intervention persists (or 
grows as in the first quarter of 2013), and the RMB is significantly undervalued? The only viable 
option would be inter-organization cooperation. 
 While the WTO does not seem to have jurisdiction over exchange rate issues, and the 
IMF and G-20 do not have any enforcement mechanisms, a combination of the strengths of each 
could act as an enforcer for deliberate and detrimental exchange rate misalignments.  Currently 
there is an interagency agreement between the WTO and IMF, and this could be amended to 
overcome the obstacles facing both organizations’ treatment of exchange rate issues.137 I believe 
adding the G-20 to this agreement could give proclamations and promises made much more 
force. A framework as follows could be effective in promoting and enforcing global exchange 
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rate policies. First, leaders from the G-20 meet annually to set goals regarding exchange rate 
policies and reforms which include specific targets for each member nation.  Once an agreement 
is reached, the agreement could be submitted to the IMF for monitoring.  During periodic 
reviews, if the IMF determines a country is in violation of its agreement, it could refer the matter 
to the WTO for enforcement or compulsory dispute resolution.  If the country refuses to comply 
with any part of this process, then the IMF in conjunction with the World Bank would have the 
power to engage in countervailing currency intervention.
138
 Countervailing currency intervention 
initiated from a global economic organization would be more beneficial and likely more 
effective than unilateral action as proposed by some in the United States. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Trying to isolate foreign exchange policy as an independent economic issue is not an 
effective macroeconomic management strategy. Blaming an undervalued RMB for America’s 
economic woes is politically attractive for United States politicians because it creates a 
boogeyman that distracts the American people from many of the internal problems created by 
these same politicians.  Instead of the United States grabbing a torch and pitchfork and trying to 
force the world’s second largest economy to undergo a radical and immediate rebalancing of its 
economy, we should continue negotiations and talks to help promote a gradual and fair 
rebalancing of the global economy as a whole.  Empowering existing international economic 
organizations to take action when there is indeed an abuse of the system is the only way for such 
action to gain legitimacy, and would keep the focus on those committing the wrongs and not 
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those who are the accusers. “Multilateralism – with a more prominent role for emerging market 
countries – is essential now to prevent competitive currency debauchery by China and the US 
from blowing up the system.”139 
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